Based upon evolutionary game theory, philosopher of science Brian Skyrms developed certain simulation-based models to explain cultural phenomena for which alternate theories failed to offer plausible explanations. This article aims to examine the preceding claim by unpacking the logical structure of the Skyrmsian theory. Because the author challenges the mathematical model employed by Skyrms, the methodology of this study is analytical rather than mathematical simulation. The Skyrmsian approach is purely phenotypic rather than genotypic. Further, it is an evolutionary generalist and thus omits the psychological mechanisms or the evolutionary histories from which humans emerge. To compensate for the lack of detail in describing psychological mechanisms, mathematical properties such as robustness are introduced in the Skyrmsian approach. This article illustrates how omitting genotypic factors and the interlocking attributes of phenotypic components might pull the Skyrmsian model away from reality. As a model of force that emphasizes the detail of psychological drives (forces), evolutionary psychology can play a vital role in defining input variables for the Skyrmsian approach. At the same time, the latter can function as an evaluation tool to assess the explanatory power of proposed models in terms of robustness. In the era of big data, both evolutionary game theorists and evolutionary psychologists can extract robust behavioral patterns and social dynamics from voluminous data.

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