The failures of organization which run high technologies can be related to the fragile complexity of these organizations. Fragility means here that the selectivity of decisions in organizations implies systematic non-knowledge about a multitude of events inside and outside the organization. It is for this reason that failures appear as surprises. It is not only the control of hazardous technologies which demands particular forms of alertness. It is also the selective preparedness for surprises that make these organizations accident-prone. The Fukushima accident resulted not simply from mismanagement but from selective decisions about necessary and seemingly sufficient safety measures, which, however, did not process enough available knowledge about possible environmental events threatening the operations of the power plants

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J. Halfmann, “The fukushima accident: The limits of organizational control of risk technologies,” International Journal ofApplied and Physical Sciences, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 22-26, 2015